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From	 2010	 to	 2012,	 that	 ship	 faced	 the	 perfect	 storm:	 The	
euro	 area	 almost	 caused	 the	 ship	 to	 sink,	 there	was	massive	
disagreement	on	how	to	get	out	of	the	storm,	and	it	was	unclear	





Yet	 the	 journey	 is	not	 over.	And	 the	boat	 is	not	 as	 solid	 as	 it	










We	 want	 neither	 to	 sound	 alarmist	 and	 pessimistic	 nor	 join	
those	who	dream	about	changing	the	very	nature	of	the	common	
project	 into	 something	 far	 beyond	what	 it	 is	 today.	While	 the	






have	worked	 on	 it	 as	 two	 think	 tanks	 because	we	 are	 struck	




















for	 all	 euro-area	 member	 states.	 Loosely	 inspired	 by	 the	
three	 stages	 in	which	 the	 euro	 itself	was	 introduced,	 this	
plan	 foresees	 the	 following	 three	 phases:	 (1)	 agreement	
on	 reforms	 and	 convergence	 goals;	 (2)	 implementation	
of	 reforms;	 and	 (3)	 introduction	 of	 a	more	 integrated	 and	




•	 	The	Modernisation	Pact:	 In	 recognition	 that	any	 long-term	
reform	process	lacking	immediate	benefits	will	be	politically	




a	 shift	 in	 policy	 towards	 greater	 cooperation	 among	 euro-
area	member	 states.	 By	 committing	 to	 the	 reallocation	 of	
public	spending	away	from	public	consumption	and	towards	
investment	 (i.e.,	 “smart	 austerity”),	 participating	 countries	
would	increase	their	fiscal	sustainability.	
The problem: Europe’s economic and 
monetary union (EMU) is not viable in the 
long run
•	 	Although	 the	 first	wave	of	 the	euro	area’s	economic	crisis	
has	receded,	this	is	no	time	for	complacency.	The	European	




of	 EMU’s	 paradoxical	 establishment	 as	 a	monetary	 union	
within	a	heterogeneous	economic	space.	These	underlying	
dynamics	 remain	 largely	 unchanged	 and	 can	 therefore	
generate	further	crises.	
The objectives: Repair and prepare
•	 	Europe	needs	to	repair	the	economic	and	political	damage	
wrought	by	the	ongoing	euro	crisis	and	prepare	for	future	
shocks.	 We	 propose	 a	 framework	 for	 an	 effective	 reform	
process	and	identify	priorities	in	need	of	further	exploration.	
•	 	In	 addition,	 we	 present	 a	 series	 of	 proposals	 designed	
to	 address	 and	 overcome	 the	 commitment	 problems	 and	




Next steps: dealing with the “known 
unknowns”









	 b.	 	The	 building	 blocks	 of	 a	 “true”	 EMU:	What	 additional	
elements	 would	 EMU	 need	 to	 allow	 it	 to	 function	
effectively	 even	 in	 a	 crisis?	How	 could	 the	 democratic	
legitimacy	of	such	a	new	framework	be	ensured?	
	 c.	 	The	 legal	 implications:	 Would	 a	 treaty	 change	 be	
required?	 What	 relationship	 would	 exist	 between	 the	
single	market	and	the	single	currency?	
	 d.	 	The	ability	to	leave	the	euro	area:	As	further	integration	
will	 necessitate	 some	 kind	 of	 compliance	mechanism,	
could	 euro-area	 exit	 be	 an	 option	 if	 certain	 member	
states	failed	to	comply?
	 e.	 	The	Modernisation	 Pact:	What	 are	 the	 highest-priority	




A.  Background: The crisis is not over
(1)	 a	 debt	 and	 investment	 gap,	 (2)	 a	 reform	 gap,	 and	 (3)	
waning	EU	legitimacy.	
The dangers of complacency
High debt levels and investment gap
6.	 	Without	growth	drivers,	 the	euro	area	as	a	whole	 is	 likely	
to	remain	on	a	low-growth	path.	The	private	sector	finds	it	
difficult	 to	 invest	 due	 to	 the	 bleak	 economic	 outlook,	 and	
banks	 are	 reluctant	 to	 lend	 because	 of	 their	 high	 level	 of	
exposure	 to	nonperforming	 loans.	At	 the	same	time,	 fiscal	
consolidation	in	the	countries	hit	hardest	by	the	crisis	has	
left	 little	 room	 for	 public	 investment.	 This	 combination	 of	
anemic	 demand	 and	 difficulties	 on	 the	 supply	 side	 has	






the	 foundations	 for	 future	 growth.	 It	 risks	 falling	 behind	
its	 competitors	 in	 key	 areas	 such	 as	 infrastructure	 and	
education.
Reform gap and distrust 
7.	 	One	widely	discussed	way	out	of	the	vicious	cycle	of	debt	is	
structural	reform	that	raises	potential	growth	rates.	However,	
under	 difficult	 economic	 conditions,	 governments	 find	 it	









2.	 	In	 recent	 weeks	 and	 months,	 however,	 the	 situation	 has	















developments	 that,	 if	 left	 unchecked,	 pose	 a	 grave	 threat	
to	European	prosperity	and	stability,	both	in	the	short	and	
medium	term.	Three	developments	are	especially	worrying:	
A. Background: The crisis is not over
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alienation	 and	 ever-increasing	 euroscepticism	 among	 a	










unanswered.	What	 is	needed	now,	 especially	when	 taking	
into	 account	 the	 tight	 electoral	 calendar,	 is	 a	method	 that	
shows	how	the	blocks	could	fit	together,	sets	out	priorities	
and	 points	 out	 the	 main	 gaps	 in	 knowledge	 (“known	
unknowns”).
The priorities: Repair and prepare
10.		In	 order	 to	 put	 a	 definite	 end	 to	 the	 crisis,	 Europe	 needs	
to	 pursue	 two	 overarching	 goals.	 First,	 it	 needs	 to	 repair	
the	 massive	 economic	 and	 political	 damages	 wrought	 by	
the	crisis,	and	second,	the	euro	area	needs	to	eradicate	its	




painful	 reforms.	 The	 situation	 is	 today	 further	 complicated	
by	mutual	recriminations	between	euro-area	member	states,	
which	 are	 born	 from	 “solidarity	 fatigue”	 in	 some	 countries	
and	 “reform	 fatigue”	 in	 others.	 Rescuing	 the	 euro	 area	 is	






the	debtor	 countries.	Populist	parties	across	 the	 continent	




8.	 	The	 prolonged	 crisis	 is	 also	 affecting	 citizens’	 attitudes	
towards	 the	 European	 Union.	 As	 a	 consequence	 of	 the	
asymmetric	adjustment	witnessed	by	Europe	in	recent	years,	
countries	 that	 tried	 to	 regain	 competitiveness	have	had	 to	
engineer	 a	 large	 and	 painful	 internal	 devaluation.1	 Such	
severe	 economic	 hardship	 would	 undermine	 confidence	
in	 any	nation-state’s	political	 system,	but	 it	 could	have	 an	
even	more	deleterious	effect	on	the	European	Union.	Since	
the	 EU	 relies	 heavily	 on	 output	 legitimacy,	 high	 levels	 of	
unemployment	 and	 prolonged	 recession	 are	 likely	 to	 fuel	
1	 	Symmetric	adjustment,	that	is,	a	devaluation	in	deficit	countries	accompanied	by	
a	simultaneous	revaluation	in	surplus	countries,	would	imply	less	severe	cuts	to	
prices	and	wages,	and	ultimately	a	 less	pronounced	economic	downturn	 in	 the	
deficit	 countries.	 See	 Grauwe	 (2012)	 on	 asymmetric	 adjustment	 and	 Schraad-
Tischler	and	Kroll	(2014),	Tressel	et	al.	(2014)	for	empirical	evidence.
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A.  Background: The crisis is not over
the	Roadmap	 is	 accompanied	 by	 a	Modernisation	Pact	
that	focuses	on	smart	debt	reduction	and	a	coordinated	
investment	initiative.
	 •	 	Moreover,	 the	 study	 identifies	 “known	 unknowns,”	





13.	 	This	 study	 is	 structured	 as	 follows:	 In	 chapter	 two,	 we	
describe	 why	 EMU’s	 current	 framework	 is	 vulnerable	
to	 crisis,	 and	 propose	 a	 set	 of	 policies	 and	 institutional	
elements	designed	to	increase	its	resilience.	Chapter	three	
and	 four	 discuss	 the	 implementation	 of	 these	 elements.	






institutional	 construction	 of	 tomorrow’s	 monetary	













How to get to resilience? Objective and 
limitations of this study




	 •	 	The	 study	 presents	 a	 working	 method	 that	 facilitates	
cooperation	 and	 commitment.	 It	 develops	 a	 Roadmap	
towards	a	sustainable	EMU,	based	on	reaching	the	four	
goals	 listed	 above	 in	 the	medium	 term.	 The	 idea	 is	 to	
build	strong	incentives	for	all	euro-area	member	states	
(as	well	as	willing	EU	member	states	outside	 the	euro	




long-term	 reform	 process	 lacking	 immediate	 benefits,	
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A.  Background: The crisis is not over
	 •	 	The	debate	over	EMU	reform	should	not	be	burdened	by	
the	 broader	 debate	 over	 the	 ultimate	 end	 of	 European	
integration.	 Therefore,	 all	 reforms	 and	 changes	 need	
to	be	derived	 from	 the	principle	 of	 subsidiarity,	which	
can	be	rephrased	as:	“As	much	additional	integration	as	
necessary	 for	 the	 effective	 functioning	of	EMU,	but	 as	
little	as	possible	given	this	constraint.”2
	 •	 	All	 euro-area	 countries	 would	 be	 required	 to	 commit	
political	 capital	 to	 the	 implementation	 of	 the	 agreed-
upon	measures.	 In	return,	 they	could	expect	 the	same	





B.  Flaws of a Minimalist Monetary Union (MMU): EMU lacks long-term viability
How MMU contributed to the crisis
18.	 	This	creation	of	a	monetary	union	within	a	heterogeneous	
economic	 space	 gave	 rise	 to	 a	 number	 of	 problematic	
dynamics	that	have	been	described	in	detail	elsewhere	and	
can	only	be	summarised	here.4	In	short,	MMU	contributed	
to	 the	 crisis	 in	 three	 ways:	 It	 fostered	 the	 emergence	 of	
imbalances,	failed	to	facilitate	timely	adjustment	and	lacked	
an	efficient	crisis-response	mechanism.




risk	 premiums	 plunged.	 Cheap	 financing	 opportunities	
spurred	 demand	 and	 inflation.	 While	 beneficial	 in	 the	
short	run,	 the	credit	boom	proved	to	have	 lasting	negative	
consequences.	 In	 a	 few	 countries,	 governments	 borrowed	
excessively,	undermining	the	resilience	of	public	 finances.	
In	 others,	 the	 additional	 funds	 inflated	 asset	 bubbles	 and	
encouraged	the	private	sector	to	take	on	debt.
20.		As	 inflation	 differentials	 persisted,	 the	 European	 Central	












a	deep	and	prolonged	crisis	 in	 the	euro	area?	 In	 line	with	
most	publications	on	 the	subject,	we	argue	 that	EMU	was	
especially	 vulnerable	 to	 external	 shocks	 and	 contagion	
because	 crucial	 elements	 of	 a	 sustainable	 currency	 union	
were	 missing.	 Most	 importantly,	 there	 was	 no	 political	
consensus	on	far-reaching	fiscal	and	economic	coordination	






not	 itself	 an	 economic	 union.	 Governance	 was	 limited	 to	
little	more	than	a	budget	and	deficit	ceiling,	complemented	
by	 a	no-bailout	 clause	 that	was	meant	 to	 encourage	 fiscal	
responsibility.	
3	 	E.g.,	 Marzinotto	 et	 al.	 2011;	 Darvas	 2012;	 Enderlein	 et	 al.	 2012;	 European	
Commission	2012;	Allard	et	al.	2013.
B.  Flaws of a Minimalist Monetary Union (MMU):  
EMU lacks long-term viability 
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as	 “deficit	 economies”	 accumulated	 an	 unsustainable	





of	 traditional	 adjustment	 tools	 such	 as	 exchange-rate	
devaluation,	hampered	member	states’	crisis	responses	
to	 a	 greater	 extent	 than	expected.	 In	 the	 absence	of	 a	
clear	 crisis-resolution	 mechanism,	 euro-area	 members	
spent	precious	 time	discussing	 fundamental	 questions	
about	 competences,	 process	 and	 institutions.	 In	 the	
meantime,	 markets	 lost	 confidence	 and	 the	 crisis	
spiraled	 out	 of	 control	 as	 economies	were	 caught	 in	 a	
vicious	cycle	of	bank	failures,	skyrocketing	public	debt	
and	faltering	growth.8
24.		The	 situation	 was	 exacerbated	 by	 the	 predominance	
of	 intergovernmental	 over	 supranational	 politics,	 and	
the	 consequent	 focus	 on	 national	 interests	 during	 the	
height	 of	 the	 crisis.	 Negotiations	 over	 conditionality	
and	 emergency	 assistance	 were	 charged	 with	 moral	






to	 an	 already	 overheating	 economy.	 For	 low-growth,	 low-
inflation	 countries	 such	 as	 Germany	 and	 France,	 the	 real	
interest	rate	was	too	high,	depressing	growth	and	investment.	
Instead	 of	 mitigating	 economic	 volatility,	 monetary	 policy	
exacerbated	it	(the	“one	size	fits	none”	problem).5
Failure to adjust 
21.	 	Due	 to	 this	 incomplete	 economic	 integration,	 the	 real-
exchange-rate	channel	proved	too	weak	to	produce	a	timely	
adjustment	of	imbalances	within	the	euro	area.6	At	the	same	





22.		Self-reinforcing	 effects	 accelerated	 subsequent	 negative	




investment,	 which	 in	 turn	 widened	 the	 current	 account	
deficit	 further.	Over	 the	 years,	 the	 countries	 today	 known	
5	 E.g.,	Enderlein	2005;	Lane	2006;	Bertola	2012;	Lane	2012,	2013;	Obstfeld	2013.
6	 	In	 a	 currency	 union	 with	 a	 strong	 real-exchange-rate	 channel,	 “high-inflation	
countries	 will	 ultimately	 face	 reduced	 external	 demand,	 whereas	 low-inflation	
countries	will	 improve	 their	 competitiveness.	 As	 a	 consequence,	 self-enforcing	
cyclical	phenomena	will	be	stopped	by	a	decline	(or	boom)	in	exports	caused	by	
the	real	appreciation	(depreciation)	of	the	exchange	rate.”	(Enderlein	et	al.	2012:	
16).	 See	Dullien	 et	 al.	 (2009)	 for	 an	 empirical	 study	 of	 the	 real	 exchange	 rate	
channel	in	the	euro	area.	
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Measured	by	 these	criteria,	 “the	euro	area	has	never	been	an	
‘optimum	currency	area’.”10	Although	member	states	are	closely	
connected	by	 internal	 trade	 ties,	 the	degree	of	 internal	 labour	
mobility	 and	 price	 flexibility	 is	 low,	 and	 the	 macroeconomic	
shocks	 experienced	 by	 member	 states	 are	 significantly	 more	
idiosyncratic	 than	 is	 true	 within	 a	 smoothly	 functioning	






EMU and the “one size fits none” paradox
In	general,	the	benefits	of	a	currency	union	can	be	expected	to	
outweigh	its	costs	when	it	encompasses	a	homogeneous	economic	
area.	 Specifically,	 research	 on	 “optimum	 currency	 areas”	 has	









Figure 1: Inﬂation dispersion in the euro area, 1999–2013 





















(As measured by the standard deviation of euro-area economies‘ inﬂation rates from the GDP-weighted average, based on the Harmonized Index of 
Consumer Prices.) Excludes countries that adopted the euro after 2001.
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estimates	 an	 implicit	 net	 transfer	 from	 creditor	 to	 crisis	
countries	of	between	€43	and	€74	billion	per	year.	This	does	
not	 include	 “the	 potentially	 very	 large	 costs	 (longer	 crisis	
duration,	 lower	 output,	 and	 higher	 unemployment)	 that	








ante	 crisis	 prevention)	 by	 calculating	 the	 implicit	 transfer	
payments	 that	 became	 necessary	 as	 a	 consequence	 of	
the	 crisis.	 The	 study	performs	 this	 task	by	 comparing	 the	
interest	rates	creditor	countries	charged	crisis	countries	with	
the	estimated	cost	of	alternative	financing;	it	consequently	
Figure 2: Net international investment position of selected euro-area economies, 1999–2013 

























B.  Flaws of a Minimalist Monetary Union (MMU): EMU lacks long-term viability
29.		Competitiveness:	Reforms	aimed	at	improving	productivity	
and	 lowering	unit	 labour	 costs	have	been	 introduced	with	





substitute	 for	 addressing	 the	 underlying	 destabilising	
dynamics	described	above.14
Imbalances and adjustment: Missing elements
30.		Completion	 of	 the	 single	 market	 and	 policy	 convergence:	
The	 most	 straightforward	 way	 to	 reduce	 imbalances	 is	 to	
strengthen	the	real-exchange-rate	channel	as	an	adjustment	
mechanism.	 This	would	 address	 the	 roots	 of	 the	 crisis	 by	
facilitating	 the	 transmission	 of	 price	 signals	 and	 moving	




and	 encouraging	 a	 higher	 degree	 of	 labour	 mobility.	 The	
Monti	 Report	 and	 the	 subsequent	 Single	 Market	 Acts	 I	
and	 II	 represent	 tentative	 steps	 towards	 deeper	 economic	
integration,	but	much	bolder	reforms	are	needed.15
31.	 	Business-cycle	 synchronisation:	 Since	 the	 real-exchange-
rate	channel	works	slowly	even	in	fully	integrated	economies	




Have reforms addressed the most relevant 
issues?
26.		In	 recent	 years,	 European	 policymakers	 have	 embarked	
on	 numerous	 reforms	 intended	 to	 remedy	 some	 of	 the	
weaknesses	identified	above.	To	what	extent	have	they	been	
successful?	
Imbalances and adjustment: Policy action and 
evaluation
27.	 	Fiscal	 surveillance:	 Reform	 efforts	 have	 to	 date	 focused	
on	 the	 prevention	 of	 unsustainable	 budget	 deficits	 via	
measures	 such	 as	 the	 so-called	 six-pack	 and	 two-pack,	
and	 the	 Treaty	 for	 Stability,	 Coordination	 and	Governance	
(TSCG).13	These	reforms	have	aimed	at	contributing	to	crisis	
prevention	 by	 making	 country	 commitments	 stronger,	
thereby	 strengthening	 confidence	 in	 national	 solvencies.	












and	 Governance	 (TSCG)	 is	 an	 intergovernmental	 agreement	 that	 introduces	
further	constraints	on	fiscal	policy,	including	a	debt	brake.
19
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common	deposit-insurance	 system,	 country	 risk	 still	 plays	
an	important	role	in	investment	decisions	during	crises.	Pro-
cyclical	 capital	 flows	 and	 vicious	 cycles	 tying	 banks	 and	
sovereigns	together	thus	remain	a	threat.
Crisis response: Missing elements
34.		Clear	 conditions	 for	 assistance:	 While	 European	
policymakers	did	manage	to	prevent	a	disorderly	exit	from	
the	euro,	this	success	carried	a	high	cost.	Relations	between	




which	 troubled	 countries	 would	 be	 provided	 with	 access	
to	 finance	 (possibly	 in	 return	 for	 strict	external	budgetary	
surveillance	mechanisms)	would	provide	an	alternative.
35.		Enhanced	 legitimacy	 and	 credibility:	 Financial	 crises	




the	 budgetary	 sovereignty	 of	 member	 states,	 credibility	
and	 legitimacy	 would	 be	 strengthened	 by	 including	
parliamentary	delegates	in	the	process.	
through	 EMU-wide	 coordination	 of	 demand	 management.	
One	way	to	accomplish	this	would	be	to	institutionalise	anti-
cyclical	 fiscal	 transfers	 between	 euro-area	member	 states,	
thus	helping	to	synchronise	their	business	cycles.	Existing	
proposals	include	a	cyclical-shock	insurance	mechanism,	a	
Europe-wide	 unemployment-insurance	 programme,	 and	 a	
common	euro-area	budget.16	
Crisis response: Policy action and evaluation
32.		Emergency	assistance:	The	creation	of	the	European	Stability	
Mechanism	 (ESM)	 underlines	 European	 states’	 general	
determination	 to	 support	 euro-area	 members	 in	 financial	
distress,	thereby	mitigating	the	risk	of	self-fulfilling	solvency	
crises.	Nevertheless,	 the	 ESM	 is	 not	 based	 on	 a	 principle	






33.		Limit	 contagion:	 The	 creation	 of	 a	 banking	 union	marked	
a	 milestone	 in	 efforts	 to	 limit	 the	 risk	 associated	 with	
the	 link	 between	 banks	 and	 sovereigns,	 thus	 preventing	








B.  Flaws of a Minimalist Monetary Union (MMU): EMU lacks long-term viability
Looking	 back	 at	 the	 challenges	 identified	 in	 this	 and	 the	
preceding	 chapter,	 we	 can	 identify	 a	 set	 of	 needed	 reforms	
whose	 joint	 implementation	would	 address	 the	most	pressing	
issues	 (see	Table	1).	 These	will	 guide	us	 in	 the	proposals	we	
develop	in	the	following	chapters.
When	 talking	 about	 reforms,	 it	 is	 useful	 to	 differentiate	 not	
only	by	policy	area,	but	also	by	objective.	A	first	set	of	reforms	






Chapter conclusion: What is needed to make 
EMU viable? 
While	 the	 euro	 crisis	 has	 resulted	 in	 significant	 reforms,	 they	
have	thus	far	focused	primarily	on	combatting	symptoms	of	the	
crisis,	 not	 its	 causes.	 Large-scale	 imbalances	 are	 still	 likely	 to	





needs	 to	 address	 its	underlying	problems	and	 simultaneously	
repair	 the	damage	 the	 crisis	has	already	wrought.	Otherwise,	
the	euro	area	may	implode	before	 long-term	reforms	can	have	
an	impact.	




Political-institutional •  Enhance EU legitimacy (see §35)
•  Reduce tensions between EU members (see §7)
•  Address national populism (see §7)
•  Complete ESM (see §34)
•  Complete banking union (see §33)
•  Enhance policy convergence (see §30)
•  Ensure business-cycle synchronisation (see §31)
Economic •  Complete structural reforms (see §7)
•  Reduce debt (see §6)
•  Close investment gap (see §6)
•  Complete the single market (see §30)
•  Modernise economies (see §29) 
•  Enhance monetary transmission (see §33)
Source: Authors
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	 •	 	Efficient	 adjustment	 mechanisms	 that	 would	 prevent	
large	imbalances	between	euro-area	member	states	from	
arising,	for	example	by	strengthening	the	real-exchange-
rate	 channel	 and	 synchronising	 the	business	 cycles	 of	
euro-area	member	states.
	 •	 	A	clear	crisis-prevention	and	resolution	framework	that	
reduces	 uncertainty	 and	 limits	 contagion,	 for	 example	
by	 encouraging	 fiscal	 responsibility	 and	 ensuring	 the	
credibility	of	assistance	schemes.	
The way to TEMU: A three-phase Roadmap
39.		While	 there	 may	 be	 widespread	 agreement	 on	 the	 need	
for	 these	 two	 components,	 little	progress	has	 in	 fact	 been	
made	 towards	 them	since	 the	 introduction	of	 the	banking	
union.	The	debate	is	often	described	as	an	impasse	caused	
by	 incompatible	 preferences	 between	 a	 “northern	 bloc”	
of	 countries	 favoring	 fiscal	 consolidation	 and	 structural	
reforms,	 and	 a	 “southern	 bloc”	 of	 countries	 demanding	
increased	 focus	 on	 mutual	 insurance	 mechanisms	 and	
investments.	 Each	 party	 is	 hesitant	 to	 concede	 to	 the	
demands	of	 the	other,	as	 it	would	thereby	weaken	its	own	
leverage.	
40.		However,	 as	 we	 would	 like	 to	 argue,	 the	 perception	 of	
reform	as	a	zero-sum	game	is	incorrect.	EMU	would	in	fact	
be	 strengthened	 if	 a	 combination	 of	 these	 “northern”	 and	
“southern”	 positions	 were	 to	 be	 implemented,	 and	 would	
offer	all	participants	long-run	benefits	related	to	reform	and	
risk-sharing.	The	key	 issues	are	credible	commitment	and	








monetary	union	work,	but	 as	 little	 as	possible	within	 this	
constraint.18






resistance	 and	 can	 act	 as	 a	 deterrent	 only	 if	 they	 are	
enforced	–	something	that	has	proven	exceedingly	difficult.	
The	ultimate	sanction,	exit	or	expulsion	from	EMU,	has	so	
far	been	a	taboo,	and	 it	 is	still	unclear	 to	what	extent	 this	
may	change.	
38.		The	goal	 of	 this	 chapter	 is	 to	 outline	possible	 elements	of	
TEMU,	while	acknowledging	that	much	further	research	is	
required	 to	 develop	 a	 full	 picture.	 Indeed,	 there	 is	 ample	
disagreement	in	Europe	today	as	to	what	would	constitute	a	
“true”	or	“genuine”	economic	and	monetary	union.	However,	
the	need	 for	 several	 core	 elements	 is	 largely	uncontested.	
Two	such	elements	are:
18	 For	a	more	detailed	discussion	of	this	principle,	see	Enderlein	et	al.	(2012:	21).
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phases:	 (1)	 setting	 targets	 for	 structural	 convergence,	 (2)	
implementation	of	reforms,	and	(3)	the	start	of	TEMU.	
43.		A	key	difference	in	this	 initiative	as	compared	to	previous	
efforts	 would	 be	 the	 use	 of	 positive	 incentives	 instead	
of	 sanctions.	 Policies	 that	 are	 perceived	 to	 be	 dictated	












45.		As	 an	 additional	 incentive	 for	 countries	 struggling	 with	
high	budget	deficits,	the	Commission	could	make	clear	that	
efforts	 to	 reach	 the	 agreed-upon	 indicators	 will	 be	 taken	
into	account	when	considering	the	setting	and	extension	of	
budget-deficit	reduction	deadlines.






timing.	 As	 advocates	 of	 fiscal	 consolidation	 have	 argued,	
governments	have	an	incentive	to	renege	on	reform	promises	
as	soon	as	the	economic	pressure	eases,	implementing	only	





threat	 of	 sanctions	 or	 a	 cessation	 of	 assistance	 would	 be	
politically	dangerous,	if	it	were	feasible	at	all.	

















of	 key	 requirements	 would	 be	 offered	 access	 to	 TEMU	
which,	in	turn,	provides	them	insurance	against	instability	
and	 self-fulfilling	 crises.	 The	 Roadmap	 consists	 of	 three	
23





Phase 1: Setting targets for convergence. 
Objectives and time frame
47.	 	Europe	 needs	 to	 identify	 elements	 that	 can	 ensure	 a	
resilient	 monetary	 union,	 and	 devise	 suitable	 indicators	
















49.		A	 second	 step	would	 feature	 negotiations	 on	 the	 issue	 of	
suitable	 indicators	 and	 time	 frames	 for	 reform.	 It	 would	
be	 essential	 for	 these	 to	 be	 clearly	 defined	 in	 a	 common	
agreement,	a	process	that	would	be	politically	challenging.	
In	 parallel,	 an	 agreement	 on	 the	 characteristics	 of	 phase	
three	 would	 be	 required,	 creating	 the	 incentives	 for	
24
C.  The Roadmap towards True Economic and Monetary Union (TEMU): A three-phase approach
Structural	 reforms	 are	 important	 for	 adjustment	 to	 the	 extent	
that	they	improve	price	and	wage	elasticity.	However,	the	trade-
offs	 merit	 systematic	 consideration.	 Some	 authors	 warn	 that	
individual	economies’	comparative	advantages	are	 founded	on	
a	 set	 of	 complementary	 institutions	 such	 as	 wage	 bargaining	
systems,	industrial	relations	and	inter-firm	relations.21	Reforms	
that	 strengthen	 the	 functioning	 of	 EMU	 may	 simultaneously	







were	 best	 suited	 to	 their	 country’s	 specific	 circumstances,	 as	
long	 as	 the	 aggregate	 result	 complied	with	 the	 requirements	











Need for further research (I):  
Convergence and structural reform
Deepening the single market
Economic	theory	suggests	that	a	deepening	of	the	single	market	
could	play	a	central	role	in	efforts	to	strengthen	market-based	
adjustment.	 Further	 research	 is	 needed	 to	 assess	 the	 extent	
to	 which	 this	 is	 feasible	 in	 practice,	 and	 to	 determine	 what	
concrete	steps	would	need	to	be	taken.	Current	taboos,	such	as	
the	 full	 implementation	of	 the	 single	market	 in	 services,	may	
need	to	be	broken.
Since	a	genuine	single	market	requires	participating	countries	
to	 construct	 comparable	 structures,	 research	 is	 also	 needed	










rate	 channel,	 resulting	 in	 a	 better	 functioning	 of	 the	 currency	
union.	It	is	the	latter	aspect	that	we	discuss	in	this	study.	
25
C.  The Roadmap towards True Economic and Monetary Union (TEMU): A three-phase approach
Phase 2: Implementation of reforms
50.		During	this	phase,	the	reforms	would	be	implemented,	and	
monitored	 by	 the	 European	 Commission,	 the	 euro-area	
summit,	and	the	Eurogroup	or	the	Economic	and	Financial	
Affairs	Council	(ECOFIN).	Joint	and	parallel	implementation	









addressing	 unpopular	 but	 important	 reforms.	 At	 the	
same	 time,	each	country	would	receive	a	 return	on	 its	





51.	 	The	details	 of	 timing	have	yet	 to	be	discussed,	 and	would	
depend	crucially	on	the	scope	of	the	reforms	agreed	in	phase	
one.	 The	 list	 of	 countries	participating	 in	TEMU	would	be	






•	 	What	 is	 the	 right	 balance	 between	 ensuring	 a	 high	










Need for further research (II):  
Non-compliance and exit
The	creation	of	TEMU	will	result	in	a	stronger	monetary	union	




union	 is	 undesirable,	 since	 it	 would	 complicate	 governance	
further	 by	 effectively	 splitting	 the	 European	Union	 into	 three	






















budgetary	 surveillance.	 The	 ESM+	 could	 also	 provide	 the	
backstop	for	the	banking	union’s	SRM.
56.		An	agreement	 could	also	be	 reached	 to	deal	with	existing	




57.	 	While	problematic	 structural	differences	are	 addressed	by	
the	 convergence	 process	 in	 phase	 one	 and	 two,	 cyclical	
differences	 are	 not.	 Temporary	 transfer	 payments	may	 be	
needed	 to	 synchronise	 TEMU	 members’	 business	 cycles	
and	prevent	the	emergence	of	imbalances	(see	chapter	two).	
This	 should	not	be	confused	with	permanent	mechanisms	
such	 as	 Germany’s	 fiscal	 equalisation	 scheme	 (“Länder-
finanzausgleich”),	 which	 is	 geared	 towards	 income	
convergence.	For	example,	a	cyclical	mechanism	based	on	
output-gap	deviations	could	result	in	net	transfer	payments	
close	 to	 zero	 in	 the	medium	 term	and	 could	 contribute	 to	
ensuring	 that	 the	ECB’s	monetary	policy	 does	not	 lead	 to	
divergent	inflation	rates	as	it	did	in	the	2000s.23






Phase 3: Start of TEMU 
Objectives
52.		TEMU	must	offer	its	prospective	participants	clear	incentives	












a	 high	 degree	 of	 convergence	 will	 result	 in	 gains	 related	
to	 trade	 and	 economics	 of	 scale,	 as	 well	 as	 an	 increased	
adjustment	capacity.	For	most	benefits,	however,	institutions	
must	first	be	created	or	reformed.	
Possible elements of TEMU
54.		A	 complete	 banking	 union	 would	 minimise	 the	 risk	 of	




55.		A	 European	 Monetary	 Fund	 or	 ESM+	 would	 protect	
its	 members	 against	 self-fulfilling	 crises	 by	 providing	
28
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Need for further research (III):  
The final stage of TEMU 
Compromise and lasting commitment
A	 successful	 compromise	 would	 need	 to	 provide	 significant	
incentives	 to	 the	countries	most	 in	need	of	 reform,	while	 still	
being	 acceptable	 to	 the	 countries	 taking	 on	 responsibility	 for	
their	peers.	While	the	choice	of	institutional	configuration	would	
Table 2: Incentives TEMU could offer to participating countries
Element Advantages for countries in a strong 
economic position




•  High degree of convergence
•   Strong real-exchange-rate 
channel
•   Automatic correction of imbalances 
without political crisis, high costs, 
mutual recriminations, etc. 
•   Prevents gradual competitiveness 
loss and painful sudden internal 
adjustment
•   Cyclical stabilisation •  EMU works as intended
•  No net transfers over the medium term
•   Will receive payments during cyclical 
downturns
•  Payments support reform efforts




•   ESM+/European Monetary 
Fund with streamlined 
voting system and clear rules 
(“sovereignty ends where 
liquidity ends”)
•   Provides stability but deters excessive 
deficits
•  No hostage situation
•  Makes self-fulfilling crises less likely
•   Conditions for emergency lending 
are known ex ante 
•  Less uncertainty on the markets
•   Complete banking union, 
including deposit-insurance 
scheme and credible 
backstop
•   Lower costs due to market failures and 
“too big to fail” situations




the	 foundations	 for	 a	 constructive	 debate.	 Many	 calls	 for	 a	






C.  The Roadmap towards True Economic and Monetary Union (TEMU): A three-phase approach
Another	 as-yet	 unsolved	 issue	 concerns	 the	 incentives,	
positive	 or	 negative,	 that	 would	 be	 needed	 to	 keep	 countries	
from	backsliding	on	reform	commitments	after	 joining	TEMU.	
Previous	and	current	experiences	with	the	Stability	and	Growth	
Pact	 raise	 the	 question	 of	 whether	 it	 is	 possible	 to	 credibly	
threaten	 large	member	 states	with	 sanctions,	 especially	 since	
an	exit	from	TEMU	should	not	be	an	option.
Interaction between institutions
Apart	 from	 political	 considerations,	 discussion	 regarding	
TEMU’s	necessary	and	desirable	institutional	architecture	needs	
to	 be	 informed	 by	 a	 comprehensive	 analysis	 of	 its	 economic	
implications.	We	need	a	clearer	understanding	of	how	elements	
such	 as	 a	 European	 Monetary	 Fund	 or	 a	 completed	 banking	
union	would	interact.	Additional	research	could	also	enable	us	
to	 make	 tentative	 statements	 about	 the	 relationship	 between	
the	alternative	paths	towards	a	viable	monetary	union:	stronger	
institutions,	economic	reform	and	transfer	payments.	
Monetary union and the single market





United	Kingdom’s	 referendum	 in	 2017	 and	 the	 consequences	
of	a	possible	British	EU	exit.	It	would	also	have	to	address	the	





•	 	To	 what	 extent	 can	 convergence	 and	 domestic	 reform	
realistically	 provide	 resilience,	 and	 where	 are	 institutions	
needed?	




•	 	Which	 specific	 solutions	 to	 enhance	 business-cycle	
synchronisation	should	be	considered?
•	 	What	 rules	 would	 ensure	 that	 countries	 maintain	 TEMU	
compliance	over	time?	
•	 	How	 would	 the	 proposed	 institutions	 interact?	 Which	
institutions	would	usefully	complement	each	other	and	how?	
•	 	What	would	 be	 an	 appropriate	 role	 for	 transfer	 payments	
in	specific	TEMU	configurations?	Under	what	circumstances	





C.  The Roadmap towards True Economic and Monetary Union (TEMU): A three-phase approach
Key research questions
•	 	What	elements	of	TEMU	could	be	 implemented	under	 the	
current	treaty?	What	are	the	advantages	and	disadvantages	
of	various	forms	of	treaty	changes?
•	 	In	 what	 order	 should	 legal	 and	 political	 questions	 be	
addressed	in	the	sequencing	of	the	debate?




Need for further research (IV):  
Legal implications
Due	 to	 the	 significant	 difficulties	 associated	 with	 EU	 treaty	












through	 the	 European	 Parliament,	 the	 greater	 involvement	 of	
national	 parliaments	 merits	 consideration.	 Any	 sustainable	
solution	 will	 need	 to	 strike	 the	 right	 balance	 between	
effectiveness	and	legitimacy.	
Relationship between EMU and EU
A	 further	 topic	 for	 consideration	 is	 the	 approach	 to	 “ins”	 and	












up	 political	 space	 by	 checking	 populism	 and	 encouraging	
the	population	to	accept	further	reforms.	










aspects	 regarding	 its	 scope	 and	 implementation	 require	
clarification.	
Immediate boost and lasting value
62.		A	 number	 of	 recent	 publications	 show	 that	 Europe	 could	









in	 the	current	political	 environment	 if	 it	did	not	 feature	a	
number	of	early	gains.	Therefore,	a	Modernisation	Pact	needs	
to	accompany	phase	one’s	negotiations	and	phase	two’s	first	
reform	efforts.	While	 the	Roadmap	aims	at	 enhancing	 the	
monetary	union’s	architecture,	this	pact	would	serve	to	guard	
against	 the	risks	that	 threaten	to	undermine	a	sustainable	
recovery.	 It	 may	 be	 particularly	 needed	 in	 Europe’s	 most	
crisis-damaged	 countries,	 but	 would	 ultimately	 benefit	 all	
euro-area	member	states.





undermines	 future	 potential	 growth.24	 Europe	 is	 in	 need	
of	 a	 far-reaching	 infrastructure-investment	 plan,	 but	
governments	struggling	with	high	levels	of	public	debt	are	
reluctant	to	increase	spending.
•	 	Tense	 relations	 between	 euro-area	 governments	 hinder	
negotiations	 over	 bold	 European	 responses	 to	 the	 crisis.	
A	 stronger	 role	 for	 European	 institutions	 governed	 by	 the	
Community	method	may	be	necessary	in	order	to	shift	the	
focus	 of	 the	 debate	 from	 conflicting	 national	 interests	 to	
common	European	goals.	
24	 E.g.,	Fichtner	et	al.	2014.
D.  Connecting the short and the medium term:  
The Modernisation Pact
32
D.  Connecting the short and the medium term: The Modernisation Pact
the	 current	economic	 conditions	due	 to	 its	 strong	positive	
effect	on	output.	But	even	countries	that	are	constrained	by	





European	 level	 could	 play	 a	 major	 role	 here.	 Examples	
could	 include	 public-private	 partnerships,	 but	 also	 public	
guarantees	for	investment	in	certain	sectors,	as	well	as	the	





Investment	 is	 needed	 immediately,	 but	 the	 reduction	 of	
public	 consumption	 is	 feasible	 only	 over	 the	 medium	
term,	 and	 the	 completion	 of	 reforms	 would	 take	 years	 –	
which	is	one	of	the	reasons	why	earlier	attempts	at	“smart	
austerity”	have	 tended	 to	 result	 in	no	 austerity	 at	 all.	 The	




It	 would	 therefore	 be	 important	 to	 ensure	 the	 successful	






include	 information	 and	 communications	 technology,	 and	
specifically	 the	 high-speed	 Internet	 connections	 needed	
by	international	business;	a	European	energy	network	that	
could	result	in	positive	scale	effects	and	a	higher	resilience;	
and	 education	 capable	 of	 producing	 long-term	 social	 and	
economic	gains.
Debt sustainability
63.		In	 order	 to	 ensure	 the	 sustainability	 of	 euro-area	
governments’	 budgets	 even	 in	 the	 face	 of	 higher	 levels	 of	
investment	 expenditure,	 each	 country	 would	 pledge	 to	
engage	in	“smart	austerity.”	Usually,	governments	that	wish	
to	 reduce	 a	 high	 debt-to-GDP	 ratio	 face	 two	 alternatives:	
















D.  Connecting the short and the medium term: The Modernisation Pact
Smart debt-reduction strategies




needs	 to	 identify	 best	 practices	 and	 possible	 pitfalls,	 such	 as	
country-specific	structures	that	may	interfere	with	the	process.
Institutional aspects 
The	 institutional	 dimension	 of	 the	 Modernisation	 Pact	 also	
requires	 further	 thought.	 Who	 would	 coordinate	 and	 lead	
the	 initiative?	 Commentators	 have	 alternately	 suggested	 the	
European	 Commission,	 the	 European	 Investment	 Bank	 and	
a	 new	 agency	 created	 specifically	 for	 the	 purpose.30	 These	
candidates	differ	not	only	with	regard	to	institutional	capacity,	
political	weight	and	experience	in	identifying	viable	investment	
opportunities;	 the	 choice	 of	 leadership	 would	 also	 influence	








Need for further research (V):  
The Modernisation Pact
Since	the	start	of	the	euro	crisis,	numerous	investment-initiative	
proposals	 have	 been	 brought	 forward,	 including	 a	 plan	worth	
€300	billion	by	the	president-elect	of	the	European	Commission,	













D.  Connecting the short and the medium term: The Modernisation Pact
If	 the	 investment	 programme	 were	 to	 include	 a	 fiscal	
expansion,	more	 thought	 is	needed	on	how	higher	budget	
deficits	 could	 best	 be	 reconciled	 with	 the	 EU’s	 rules	 on	
fiscal	 governance.	 The	 options	 include	 a	 more	 generous	
interpretation	 of	 the	 flexibility	 provided	 in	 the	 existing	
rules,	a	rule	change	that	allows	for	higher	investment	levels,	































primarily	 on	 incentives,	 not	 on	 sanctions.	 It	 would	 mark	
a	 change	 in	 policy	 towards	 a	 more	 cooperative	 approach	
among	 euro-area	 member	 states,	 visible	 both	 in	 methods	
and	 goals.	 Thus,	 the	 study	 aims	 to	 reconcile	 demands	 for	
reform	 and	 fiscal	 sustainability	 with	 calls	 for	 increased	
investment	and	risk-sharing.
69.		Further	research	is	needed	on	(1)	the	nature	of	the	required	















Phase 1:  
Setting of targets for 
structural convergence  
(see §47–49) In parallel:
Investment programme, 
but with ongoing 
reduction of debt levels 
(§59–66)
Begin discussion of reform contract. What reforms in which 
countries are needed to enable a better-functioning EMU? 
Message: All countries need reforms (even Germany). Also, how 
much policy convergence is necessary to make EMU work?  
What investments are most needed to modernise European 
economies?
2016–21
Phase 2:  
Implementation of 
reforms (§50–51)
The joint and parallel implementation of reforms in all euro-area 
countries would have clear advantages:
(1)  Dynamics similar to EMU accession: clear targets would 
channel efforts, increase peer pressure
(2) Principle of quid pro quo becomes clear




Phase 3:  
Start of TEMU (§52–58)
This is the “carrot.” The content of the package would be 
determined by discussion, but must include strong incentives. 
Likely components include: completed banking union, enhanced 
ESM, completed single market. The main question needs to be 
answered by Germany: How much integration and solidarity 
is acceptable? The objective is clear: The compromise needs to 
envisage a TEMU that features strengthened governance, better 
crisis resilience and a basis for stronger structural growth. 














































































































































©  2014 Bertelsmann Stiftung and  
Jacques Delors Institut – Berlin
Bertelsmann	Stiftung
Carl-Bertelsmann-Straße	256
33311	Gütersloh
www.bertelsmann-stiftung.de
Responsible for content
Henrik	Enderlein
Joachim	Fritz-Vannahme	
Rapporteur
Jörg	Haas
Collaboration
Andreas	Esche,	Thieß	Petersen
Edit
Barbara	Serfozo,	Berlin
Design
Nicole	Meyerholz,	Bielefeld
Photo
©	kontrast-fotodesign	–	iStockphoto.com
Production
Heiden	Druck	&	Medien	GmbH,	Gütersloh
Imprint

